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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
NEW YORK EDUCATION LAw

N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813: Monetary demand is an essential element of a
verified claim.
Section 3813 of the Education Law provides that no action or
special proceeding may be maintained against a school district or board
of education unless
a written verified claim upon which such action or special proceeding is founded was presented to the governing body of said
district within three months after the accrual of such claim....
This statute unquestionably makes filing of a claim within the specified
period a condition precedent to an action or special proceeding. 225 The
recent case of P.J. Panzeca, Inc. v. Board of Education, Union Free
DistrictNo. 6,226 confirms this statutory interpretation.
In Panzeca an action was brought to recover damages from defendant Board of Education for alleged breach and wrongful termination
of contract. Defendant moved to dismiss, on the ground that plaintiff
had failed to comply with the notice-of-claim requirement of Education
Law § 3813(1). Plaintiff had served the Board with an order to show
cause in a prior action. The Court of Appeals, reversing the lower
courts' denials of defendant's motion, held that papers served in another
action do not suffice as notice. It reasoned that the "statute distinguishes
between an action and the filing of a claim, and the filing is a precondition to the bringing of an action." 22 7 Additionally, it pointed out that
even if the orders to show cause could satisfy the filing requirement,
they were nonetheless defective, for plaintiff failed to include a monetary demand -"the critical element in a verified claim in a contract
228
action."
In light of the ends sought to be achieved by the notice requirement, Panzeca and its predecessors represent the most logical approach
to interpreting the Education Law. 229 Clearly, it is advantageous to all
2 25

See In re Bd.of Educ., Union Free School Dist. No. 7 v. Heckler Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d
476, 166 N.E.2d 666, 199 N.Y.S. 649 (1960); Natoli v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwich, 277
App. Div. 915, 98 N.Y.S.2d 540 (per curiam), appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 1063, 100
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (3d Dept' 1950), appeal denied, 302 N.Y. 690, 98 N.E.2d 486, aff'd, 803 N.Y.
646, 101 N.E.2d 646 (1951); State v. Waverly Cent. School Dist., 53 Misc. 2d 843, 280
N.Y.S.2d 507 (County Ct. Tioga County 1966), aj'd, 28 App. Div. 628, 280 N.Y.S. 505
(3d Dep't 1967).

22629 N.Y.2d 508, 272 N.E.2d 488, 323 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1971), rev'g 35 App. Div. 2d
1085, 318 N.YS.2d 282 (2d Dep't 1970).
227 Id. at 510, 272 N.E.2d at 489, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 980.

228 Id. at 509, 272 N.E.2d at 488, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
229 See, e.g., Newburgh Nursery, Inc. v. Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 2, 41
Misc. 2d 997, 247 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1964); see also 23 CAuatoDy-WArr 2d,
§ 144:85, at 362 (1968).
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parties and to the courts to provide a means by which unnecessary
litigation might be avoided. In cases involving contracts, such as Panzeca, litigation might be prevented by a settlement based on an amount
named in the plaintiff's claim; in cases involving torts, filing of a claim
will, at the least, enable the defendant to investigate it while the facts
280
are still fresh.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS

Contempt: Judicial and criminal contempt convictions arising out of
single episode not barred under double jeopardy prohibition.
In People v. Colombo 231 the New York Court of Appeals has unanimously decided that a recent Supreme Court pronouncement does not
alter the traditional view that successive contempt convictions under
the Judiciary and Penal Laws are not within the ambit of the double
jeopardy prohibition.
Granted immunity, defendant Colombo nevertheless refused to
testify before a regular Kings County grand jury investigating the use
of legitimate business enterprises as a cover for alleged criminal activities. A supreme court justice orderered the defendant to testify. Subsequently, he was adjudged in criminal contempt of court pursuant to
section 750(A)(3) of the Judiciary Law 232 for his refusal to obey the

supreme court order, and was sentenced to thirty-days imprisonment.
Thereafter, the grand jury indicted defendant for his refusal to
testify in violation of section 600(6) of the former Penal Law.283 His
230See, e.g., Winbash v. City of Mt. Vernon, 306 N.Y. 327, 333, 118 N.E.2d 459, 462

(1954).
23129 N.Y. 2d 1, 271 N.E.2d 694, 323 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1971).
232 A. A court of record has power to punish for a criminal contempt, a person
guilty of any of the following acts, and no others:
3. Willful disobedience to its lawful mandate.
N.Y. JUDIciARY LAw § 750(a)(3) (McKinney 1969).

The former section 600(6) provided:
A person who commits a contempt of court, of any one of the following kinds,
is guilty of a misdemeanor:
233

6. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness, or, after being
sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory ...
The present counterparts of the above provision are:
A person is guilty of criminal contempt when he engages in any of the following

conduct:
4. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness in any
court proceeding except a refusal to give testimony before a grand jury, or
after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50(4) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
A person is guilty of criminal contempt of a grand jury where, after having
been granted immunity, he refuses to be sworn as a witness before a grand jury,
or who, after being sworn as such a witness, refuses to answer any legal and

